The curious case of the U.S. monetary base by Richard G. Anderson
I
t is common for monetary policy actions 
to be gauged by their effect on short-term 
interest rates.  The current stance of policy 
in the U.S. is associated with rates near 
zero, leaving further declines untenable.  
In this policy environment, it is useful to 
monitor alternative measures of the stance 
of monetary policy.  Much recent attention 
has been focused on a measure called the 
“monetary base,” which has risen sharply 
since the fall of 2008.  (See Figure 1.)  Should 
analysts and policymakers be concerned 
about this increase?
The monetary base is the narrowest mea- 
sure of money used by economists.  It con-
sists of deposits held at the Federal Reserve 
by depository financial institutions (includ-
ing commercial banks, savings banks and 
credit unions), plus all coin and currency 
held by households and businesses (includ-
ing the depository institutions).  These 
financial assets are used for “final” settle-
ment of transactions in the economy— 
currency for hand-to-hand payment among 
persons and businesses, and deposits at the 
Fed for bank-to-bank settlement that is irre-
vocable (including check clearing and wire 
payments)—hence, the label of “base” (that 
is, basic) money.
In normal times, the monetary base 
increases and decreases roughly dollar-for-
dollar with changes in the amount of assets 
held by the Fed.  When the Fed buys an asset, 
such as a Treasury security, it writes a check 
drawn on itself.  The recipient deposits the 
check at his or her bank, which sends the 
check to the Fed so that the check’s amount 
may be credited to its Federal Reserve 
account.  The funds at the Fed are valuable 
because they may be used to pay debts due, 
on behalf of customers, to other banks.
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During the past year and  
a half, the Fed has introduced a  
number of programs to reduce stress in 
financial markets.
1  These programs have 
greatly increased the amount of assets held 
by the Fed—and, in turn, the monetary 
base.  Analysts and commentators are 
concerned that, unless the increases are 
reversed promptly when economic activ-
ity expands, inflation will accelerate.  Such 
fears are reasonable because, as explained 
below, the aggregate amount of deposits 
held by banks at the Fed is not reduced by 
their lending and borrowing—hence, a 
few dollars’ increase in the monetary base 
potentially can lead to the creation of large 
amounts of new credit. 
Traditional Monetary Policy
The numerous new Fed programs have 
been labeled “nontraditional” monetary  
policy.  But, in contrast, what is “tradi-
tional” policy?  And what separates tradi-
tional policy from nontraditional policy? 
Traditional monetary policy refers to 
the Fed’s seeking to maintain an overnight 
interest rate (the federal funds rate) close to 
a desired target.  Each day, the Fed nudges 
the federal funds rate toward a desired 
target by buying or selling Treasury securi-
ties.  When the Fed buys a Treasury security, 
deposits at the Fed increase and, other things 
unchanged, the overnight interest rate falls; 
conversely, when it sells a security, other 
things equal, overnight interest rates rise.  
Each purchase or sale changes the size of the 
monetary base—but the daily changes have 
no effect on economic activity and are cor-
rectly ignored.  Only when multiple changes 
accumulate into a large and persistent change 
in the monetary base does an impact arise on 
economic activity,  
both real output and inflation.
It is important to note that the Fed initi-
ates these actions that change the size of 
the monetary base; households and firms 
(including financial firms), individually or 
as a group, cannot change the total amount 
of deposits that they, as a group, hold at the 
Fed.
2  To see this, suppose bank A makes a 
new loan by crediting $1 million to a cus-
tomer’s checking account.  As the borrower 
spends the loan and the funds are deposited 
in other banks, bank A’s deposit at the Fed 
will shrink because it must pay some of its 
deposits to the banks that have received 
the spent funds.  The deposits at the Fed do 
not disappear, however; the deposits at the 
Fed move from bank A’s deposit account to 
another bank’s account, but the total quan-
tity is neither increased nor decreased by  
the borrowing, spending and saving deci-
sions made by households and firms (includ-
ing banks).
Nontraditional Monetary Policy
Recently introduced Fed programs have 
been labeled nontraditional for several 
reasons.  First, the overnight interest rate 
usually targeted by the Fed is near zero.  
Hence, the Fed’s purchase and sale of 
securities must be judged by whether these 
actions reduce stress and improve credit 
conditions in individual financial markets, 
rather than by their impact on the economy 
as a whole.  Second, whereas traditional 
policy involves buying and selling Treasury 
securities, nontraditional programs involve 
buying financial assets other than Treasury 
securities.  These assets, necessarily, have 
greater default risk than Treasurys.  By 
buying these assets, the Fed accepts some 
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likely is small.  Third, the assets in these 
nontraditional programs have been paid for 
with deposits at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York.  Although the assets are non-
traditional, their purchase with deposits at 
the Fed is very traditional.  As usual, paying 
for purchased assets with deposits at the 
Fed causes increases in the monetary base 
dollar-for-dollar.
Increase in the Monetary Base
The table shows a simplified version of the 
Fed balance sheet for two weeks: the week 
ending Sept. 10, 2008, and the week ending 
Jan. 14, 2009.  Liabilities include currency, 
deposits of depository institutions, the 
Treasury’s deposit and capital.  (The sum 
of the first two equals the monetary base.)  
Assets have been grouped into traditional 
(Treasurys and similar securities) and non-
traditional (assets acquired under the new 
programs).
3
During the four months ending January 
2009, the Fed’s nontraditional programs 
increased deposits at the Fed from $32 
billion in the first half of September to 
$828 billion in the latter half of January.
4  
The monetary base doubled.  (Currency 
increased, but by only a modest amount.)
Monetary Policy Implications  
of Nontraditional Programs
In several speeches, Fed Chairman Ben  
Bernanke has emphasized that nontradi-
tional policy focuses on reducing stress in 
specific financial markets, that is, on credit 
easing.  The focus is apparent in the types of 
securities purchased, including commercial 
E N DNO T E S
 1  A chronology of these programs is available 
at www.stlouisfed.org/timeline.  See also 
Aubuchon and Bernanke.
 2  Again, the devil is in the details:  The sentence 
is true if (when) the level of depository  
institutions’ borrowing from the Fed does  
not change.
 3  For more information on the impact of new 
programs on the Fed’s balance sheet, see Gavin.
 4  Not all programs have increased deposits at 
Federal Reserve banks.  The securities lending 
program, for example, does not affect deposits 
at Federal Reserve banks.  Plus, some programs 
increase deposits at Federal Reserve banks via 
additional Fed lending (not by the purchase of 
assets), including the Term Auction Facility, 
increased discount window lending and swap 
lines with foreign central banks.
 5  See Anderson.
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Week Ending Jan. 14, 2009
assets liabilities
Traditional assets     593 federal reserve notes   844
       Treasury securities 476 bank deposits   828
       other Traditional assets 117 other liabilities    344
nontraditional assets 1,465 Capital account     42
Total Assets 2,058 Total Liabilities 2,058
Week Ending Sept. 10, 2008
assets liabilities
Traditional assets     722 federal reserve notes  798
       Treasury securities 480 bank deposits     32
       other Traditional assets 242 other liabilities     54
nontraditional assets    202 Capital account     40
Total Assets    924 Total Liabilities   924
soUrCE: federal reserve board H.4.1.
Table 1
Federal Reserve Balance Sheet
paper, mortgage-backed securities and  
privately issued asset-backed securities.   
Be this as it may, the programs nonetheless 
have greatly increased the monetary base—
and portend, if not promptly reversed when 
economic activity revises, higher future 
inflation.  When will confidence return to 
the economy, such that banks feel able to 
accurately assess the riskiness of loans and 
borrowers feel confident in their ability to 
repay?  When confidence returns, will finan-
cial markets be roiled as the Fed reduces its 
assets and the monetary base?  Finally, the 
Fed now has an additional policy instru- 
ment not previously available: the payment 
of interest on deposits at the Fed.
5  Can it 
be used to forestall undesired increases in 
bank lending?
Recent increases in the monetary base are 
far greater than any previously in American 
history (even adjusted for the size of the 
economy), surely a “noble experiment” in 
policymaking.  Will these policies be suc-
cessful without accelerating inflation?  The 
epitaph to this curious case of monetary 
base expansion is yet to be written. 
Richard G. Anderson is an economist at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  For more on 
his work, see http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/
anderson/.
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